Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2019

Watching Insider Trading Law Wobble: Obus, Newman, Salman,
Two Martomas, and a Blaszczak
Donald C. Langevoort
Georgetown University Law Center, langevdc@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2209
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3490636

This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

January 8, 2019 Draft

Watching Insider Trading Law
Wobble: Obus, Newman, Salman,
Two Martomas, and a Blaszczak
Donald C. Langevoort*
“The crime of insider trading is a straightforward concept that some
courts have somehow managed to complicate.”—Judge Jed Rakoff in
United States v. Pinto-Thomaz1

I. INTRODUCTION

Commentators repeatedly point out that the law of insider
trading, though formally derived from Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is best understood
read as a common law-like subject.2 That is because neither the
statute nor the rule addresses insider trading explicitly, leaving to
the judiciary to do all the work of fashioning legal doctrine about
when and why insider trading operates as securities fraud. The
SEC has acquiesced in this judicial law-making for the most part,
preferring taking its chances in the courts (more often than
Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center. Thanks to Hillary Sale, Bob Thompson, Adam Pritchard, Donna Nagy,
Andrew Verstein . . for comments on earlier drafts.
1 352 F. Supp.3d 287, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
2 E.g., Jill Fisch, Constructive Ambiguity and the Judicial Development of Insider
Trading, 71 SMU L. Rev. 749, 757 n. 62 (2018), citing Thomas Merrill: The
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 21 (1985).
*
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anywhere else in the Southern District of New York) than putting
the definition of insider trading up for political haggling. It has
engaged in very specific rulemaking on a few contested issues, but
been far from comprehensive; even when the Commission has
adopted definitional rules (10b5-1 and -2), the courts do not
always defer.3 Up to now,4 at least, the judiciary has “owned”
insider trading law, for the most part choosing to give it broad
reach.
Insider trading is a crime, often harshly penalized. Common
law crimes are not in fashion, to say the least. So the accretive
process by which the law on this topic evolves—for all the
benefits of incrementalism5—has many critics.6 When insider
trading law wobbles visibly on some matter, there are enhanced
concerns about notice, predictability and due process as well as
the substantive merit of the specific principles being applied.
No subject in insider trading law has recently wobbled more
than the standards for tipper-tippee liability.7 After setting a
See p. --- infra. For a discussion of how the SEC might go further, see John
C. Coffee, Jr., Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps,
and Strategies, 2013 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 281.
4 In December 2019, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a
bill to define unlawful insider trading, perhaps signaling a shift in the locus of
law-making. H.R. 2534,115th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 5,, 2019). Its fate in the
Senate is unclear.
5 See Peter J. Henning, Making up Insider Trading Law as You Go, 56 Wash. U.
J. L. & Pol’y 101 (2018); Fisch, supra.
6 E.g., Miriam Baer, Insider Trading’s Legality Problem, 127 Yale L.J.F. 129
(2017); John P. Anderson, Greed, Envy and the Criminalization of Insider
Trading, 2014 Utah L. Rev. 1 (2014). The common law crime concern is part,
of course, of sustained disagreement about whether insider trading law
makes sense, on which the academic literature is exhaustive. See generally,
e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, ED., RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF INSIDER TRADING (2013); Merritt B. Fox et al., Informed Trading and its
Regulation, 43 J. Corp. L. 820 (2018).
7 For a collection and assessment of the many dimensions to tipper-tippee
liability, see DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT
AND PREVENTION ch. 4 (2019 rev.ed.)
3
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fiduciary duty-based framework for insider trading liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in Chiarella v. United States8 in 1980,
the Supreme Court ruled in Dirks v. SEC9 three years later that
tipper-tippee liability requires proof that the tipper be breaching
a fiduciary-like duty in passing on the information to the tippee
for the tipper’s own personal benefit, and that the tippee knows or
should know of that breach. A host of bothersome issues thus
arose, some addressed in dicta in the Court’s opinion but mostly
left for future litigation—most notably, what does personal
benefit mean, and how, exactly, is it applied in motions to dismiss
or expressed in jury instructions? Many dozens of cases since
then have confronted this question. Judge Rakoff has decided
more than a few and, more candidly than most, expressed
frustration via occasional lamentations to his readers (or the lawgods) about what is going on. His frustrations will be our guide to
what follows, from a judge whose involvement in insider trading
enforcement goes way back to the Chiarella prosecution.10
For two decades after Dirks, the law steadily evolved in a
way that made the personal benefit requirement either easy for
enforcers to satisfy or completely inapplicable.11 When it applied,

445 U.S. 222 (1980). In an opinion by Justice Lewis Powell, Chiarella
reversed the conviction of the defendant, who worked at a financial printing
firm, because he owed no fiduciary-like duty to others trading the same
shares in the securities marketplace.
9 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Dirks reversed an administrative sanction imposed
against a high-profile investment adviser who received material nonpublic
information from whistleblowers about a fraud-riddled company whose
shares he had recommended to clients, and caused them to sell their shares
before the fraud was revealed.
10 See Rakoff’s Roots Run Deep in Insider Trading Law, May 29, 2015,
https://www.law360.com/articles/660987/rakoff-s-roots-run-deep-ininsider-trading-law.
11
Donna Nagy’s important work has traced this devolution in what
enforcers had to show under Dirks. See Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks:
Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. Corp. L. 1 (2016); Donna M.
Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 Iowa
8
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two kinds became standard: quid pro quos with some pecuniary
pay-offs (e.g., kickbacks to the tipper), and “gifts” of information
to family members and friends. That increasingly relaxed
approach emboldened both criminal prosecutors and the SEC. In a
2012 civil case, SEC v. Obus,12 the Second Circuit offered a
sweeping restatement of all the elements of tipper-tippee liability,
some never previously so characterized. (Rakoff famously called
the decision “Delphic” in his first opportunity to apply its
teachings,13 not in a good way). Among other things, the Obus
framework allowed tippees to be held liable without knowledge of
the tipper’s alleged benefit.
Soon thereafter, in United States v Newman,14 a panel of the
Second Circuit addressed personal benefit more strictly,
seemingly—but without directly saying so—rewriting Obus at
least in the criminal context as to the standards for both tipper
and tippee complicity. It sought to connect gift-giving and real
benefit by demanding proof of a sufficiently close relationship
between tipper and tippee “that is objective, consequential and
represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly
valuable nature” and insisting that the tippee have actual
knowledge of the breach and benefit.15 Newman was a rare godsend to the defense side, destabilizing the doctrine on which many
prior and on-going cases were founded. But then, on review of a
Ninth Circuit decision that rejected the most demanding aspects
of the Newman approach as to the meaning of gift in family
settings (United States v. Salman,16 written by the peripatetic
L. Rev. 1315 (2009). See also Donald C. Langevoort, The Demise of Dirks:
Shifting Standards for Tipper-Tippee Liability, Insights, June 1994, at 23.
12 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012). See Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions”
in the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, 2013 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 429,
449-58 (2013).
13 United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
14 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
15 Id. at 452.
16 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015).
4
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visiting Judge Rakoff), the Supreme Court agreed that Newman
went too far in its retrenchment.17 Precisely how much too far
was unclear, however, so the wobbling was far from over.
Then came the two Martomas. The main legal question
presented on appeal in a highly publicized prosecution, though
not necessarily crucial to the ultimate outcome of the case,18 was
whether the gift benefit prong under Dirks and Salman requires a
close pre-existing relationship of family or friendship. Or is there
a personal gift benefit in any intentional conveyance given with
the purpose or expectation that the tippee will trade? In Martoma
I,19 a divided Second Circuit panel said that the expectation is
enough, regardless of to whom, and abrogated Newman to the
extent that it indicated otherwise by its reference to a
meaningfully close relationship. There was a petition for
rehearing en banc claiming that (among other things) the panel
had no authority to overturn that holding in Newman absent
direct Supreme Court direction. Nearly a year later, in June 2018,
the panel substituted a completely new opinion (Martoma II)
reinterpreting Newman rather than abrogating it, but once again
making the tipper’s specific purpose to confer a benefit on the
tippee sufficient and potentially dispositive.20 Part of Newman’s
Salman v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 420 (2016).
In Martoma, there was separate evidence of a pecuniary motivation for the
tips. Dr. Gilman, the main tipper, was being paid considerable consulting fees
for his meetings with Martoma to discuss the clinical drug trials in which
Gilman was involved. The disagreement between the majority and Judge
Pooler was as to the correctness of the charge to the jury on the theory of gift
benefit (which they both agreed was flawed) and whether it was harmless
error in light of the pecuniary benefit.
19 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017).
20 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018)(appropriate to infer “that the corporate insider
receives a personal benefit . . . from deliberately disclosing valuable,
confidential information without a corporate purpose and with the
expectation that the tippee will trade on it.” Id. at 79. The small differences
between the two Martomas is clear enough. See Marshall v. United States,
368 F. Supp.2d 674 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). I will simply use “Martoma” for this case
except as necessary to distinguish from the withdrawn opinion, Martoma I.
17
18
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own precious gift to Wall Street and the defense side was thus
taken back.21
None of this is breaking news. Newman and Salman have
been the subjects of extensive academic and professional
commentary for the last few years, and the Martoma cases have
now joined the on-going contestation.22 Nearly everyone who
writes much about insider trading (and a few interlopers as
well23) has had something to say about the wobble, with wildly
mixed opinions.24 As to the panel’s authority to abrogate
Newman, for example, a case comment in the Harvard Law Review
treats Martoma II as a “stealth overruling” of Newman, but then
concedes that Newman was a stealth overruling of Obus (and so
on), so that what Martoma II did should not cause great angst.25
The merits of the debate should matter more.
My essay is initially about the kind of gratuitous tipping
addressed in Martoma, which might not seem to be practically
important but instead more of a legal brain teaser.26 In this
Courts in the Second Circuit have noted the effect of Martoma on Newman.
E.g., Gupta v. United States, 913 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2019); United States v. Pinto
Thomaz,, supra, 352 F. Supp.3d at 301 (“What remains of Newman therefore
applies in only the rarest of cases”).
22 E.g.,, John C. Coffee, Jr., Tippers and Tippees: The Impact of Martoma II,
Columbia
Blue
Sky
Blog,
July
23,
2018,
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/07/23/tippees-and-tippers---theimpact-of-martoma-ii/; A.C. Pritchard, Insider Trading Law and the
Ambiguous Quest for Edge, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 945 (2018); Jonathan Macey,
Martoma and Newman: Valid Corporate Purpose and the Personal Benefit
Test, 71 SMU L. Rev. 869 (2018)(criticizing Martoma I); Michael Guttentag,
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,, 69 Fla. L. Rev. 519, 542-43 (2017).
23 See Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common Law Principles of Insider
Trading After United States v. Newman, 125 Yale L.J. 1482 (2016).
24 See Symposium: Salman v. United States, 69 Stan. L. Rev. Online (2016),
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/type/symposium-salman/.
25 U.S. v. Martoma—Second Circuit Redefines Personal Benefit Requirement for
Insider Trading, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1730 (2019).
26 The closest precedent I know of involves a tip to the insider’s barber. See
SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp.2d 941 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
21
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academic spirit, Martoma I posed a hypothetical about a wellheeled apartment dweller giving a holiday gift to his doorman in
the form of a stock tip in place of the usual cash. But this hypo
isn’t particularly well-crafted insofar as valuable tips to doormen
can be seen as an effort to buy superior service for the
forthcoming year, which would be a form of pecuniary gain, not a
pure gift. So Martoma II strips this down a gift of a stock tip to
someone simply with the statement that he (the tippee) can make
money by trading on the information. Joan Heminway’s thoughtful
article on the subject uses a more compelling “Robin Hood” hypo
about tips meant to take from the rich and give to the poor.27 All
these are fun to a degree, but the fact that some version of the
question presented itself in both Newman and Martoma, each a
big-time hedge fund-related prosecution, shows how closely it lies
to the subject of what constitutes a legitimate trading edge for
securities professionals, and where the line is they cannot safely
cross. Big money turns on the answer. As we shall see, the
decision in Martoma arguably gives enforcers a tool against
selective disclosure to market professionals they might not have
realized was in the toolkit.
Contrary to many, I think Martoma’s holding is wellgrounded. Explaining why will take us into the weeds of insider
trading theory and doctrine, the overgrowth of which is widely
acknowledged. This is incurable without statutory codification,28
but even then would still fall short of the clarity many say they
want. The robust persistence of insider trading enforcement
(criminal and civil) is based as much on politics as coherent
policy.29 But unlike others who have critiqued the politics of
Joan McLeod Heminway, Tipper/Tippee Insider Trading as Unlawful
Deceptive Conduct: Insider Gifts of Material Nonpublic Information to
Strangers, 56 Wash. U. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 65, 68-69 (2018).
28 See pp. --- infra.
29 Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady Roberts: The Ideology and Practice
of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1319, 1320-21 (1999). To be
27
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insider trading, I think that the expressive political dimension to
the law has considerable legitimacy if kept in bounds. Insider
trading enforcement has become a recognizable brand symbol for
American-style securities regulation, touching on some deepseated public fascination, envy and distaste for the arrogance of
economic elites and others who exploit some undeserved edge in
the stock markets. It is not about creating a level playing field,
which as Judge Rakoff has pointedly said is unrealistic,30 but
rather when to take away the edge that comes from wrongfully
being high on the privileged side. The campaign against abusive
trading generates public support for the complex mission of
investor protection more generally, which is consequential
whether or not we have a coherent theory of how and why it
constitutes securities fraud.31
But wait, there is more. At the very end of 2019, the Second
Circuit sent the insider trading ball bouncing in an unexpected
direction yet again, holding that to the extent that a tipper-tippee
case is brought as either mail/wire fraud or under a (until now)
rarely utilized public company securities fraud statute, personal
benefit has no place at all. At first glance, the case—United States
clear, I think there are sound policy reasons to restrict insider trading but
they are more wonkish than the rhetoric surrounding insider trading
enforcement seems to assume.
30 See p. --- infra.
31 Some critics of the fairness approach to insider trading regulation agree
with the political description of the motivation but denounce its normative
justification, seeing the SEC’s efforts as pure rent-seeking either on the part
of the Commission itself or certain interest groups who benefit from
aggressive insider trading enforcement. E.g., Jonathan Macey & David
Haddock, Regulation on Demand: The Influence of Special Interest Groups on
SEC Enforcement of Insider Trading Rules, 30 J. L. & Econ. 311 (1987); more
recently, see Jonathan Macey, The Central Role of Political Myth in Corporate
Law,
Aug.
19,
2019,
available
at
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3435676. This essay is not an
effort to resolve that debate but instead argues for the coherence of insider
trading law as we know it as derived from an effort to promote fairness in
markets, though not via egalitarianism. See pp. --- infra.
8
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v. Blaszczak32—provides a well-lit pathway for criminal
prosecutors, but not the SEC (or private plaintiffs), to pursue
tippees simply on their awareness that the inside information
should be considered stolen goods. It is much too early to say
what this new line of inquiry will bring, or even if the holding will
survive much after its birth. On close inspection, however, it
connects some dots that, in hindsight, have long been in plain
sight.
So we will first address the road from Dirks to Martoma,
which will then put us on a course that eventually gets us to
Blaszczak and the pinball-like motion of insider trading law circa
2020, Chiarella’s fortieth anniversary. Unnecessary complication?
We shall see.33

II. READING DIRKS LITERALLY: BENEFIT TO THE TIPPER

The precise question debated in Martoma is about what to
do if an insider tips someone with whom he has no close personal
relationship and without any expectation of compensation in
return.
Both Martomas purport to draw their doctrinal
--- F.3d --- (2d Cir. 2019). On the statutory potential of the criminal
securities fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1348, see Wendy Gerwick Couture,
Criminal Securities Fraud and the Lower Materiality Standard, 41 Sec. Reg. L.J.
77 (2013); Karen Woody, The New Insider Trading, Ariz. St. L.J. (forthcoming,
2020).
33
Michael Perino reminds us in an important article that for all the
occasional doctrinal drama, most insider trading cases do not push on the
boundaries of doctrine, in which case the wobbles are of importance only to a
narrow band of enforcement. Michael A. Perino, Real Insider Trading, Feb.
2019,
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3338536.
He
provides good evidence that aggressive cases are the exception, and that
enforcers back off when they sense the law is moving away from being
aggressive.
32
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conclusions from a close reading of Supreme Court precedent,
mainly Dirks. (Salman—a blessedly unanimous opinion by the
Court given the egregious facts—says little more than Dirks was
clear enough about its meaning and didn’t need or warrant
Newman’s gloss.) But as shown by the ensuing debate in the two
Martomas between the majority and Judge Pooler, who dissented
twice, Dirks offers its reader plenty to stumble over. Seeing why
requires some background.

A. History, Text and Structure

I and many others have recounted in some detail how the
law of insider trading under Rule 10b-5 came to be.34 Historically,
it is very much the product of a particular and now long gone
historical period during which courts construed federal statutes
and rules purposively, construing grants of law-making authority
“flexibly, not restrictively.”35 (The Second Circuit was initially
ambivalent as to this activism but soon became a convert in a long
series of securities cases over the course of the 1960s and early
70s,36 occasionally restrained by the moderating impulses of the
remarkably influential Judge Henry Friendly.37) The seminal
See Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning
Non-Public Information, 73 Geo. L.J. 1083 (1985); LANGEVOORT, INSIDER
TRADING, supra, ch. 2. On back further in time, an interesting history is
presented in Michael Perino, The Lost History of Insider Trading, 2019 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 951.
35 See A.C. Pritchard, Launching the Insider Trading Revolution: SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, in Bainbridge, ed., RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra, at 33,
about the case from which those often-quoted (though less so lately) words
came.
36 See A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law in the Sixties: The
Supreme Court, the Second Circuit and the Triumph of Purpose Over Text, 94
Notre Dame L. Rev. 371 (2018).
37 Historical research shows how much Friendly, in turn, was influenced by
Professor Louis Loss of Harvard, with whom he had frequent correspondence
34
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Texas Gulf Sulphur case was an exemplary product of this kind of
thinking. Even though open-market insider trading is hard to see
as deceptive (the insider trader communicates nothing false or
misleading simply by submitting an anonymous bona fide order to
buy or sell), the word “fraud” was taken to be sufficiently elastic
so as to encompass constructive fraud—an equitable principle
that would allow abusive behavior (including fiduciary breaches)
to be treated as if deceptive to avoid unjust enrichment,38 even if
the common law elements of deceit are absent. Duties reached as
far as need be to inspire investor faith in market integrity.39 Or so
it was thought.
That generous approach to securities law was trashed by
the Burger Court starting in the mid-1970s. The surprise,
perhaps, is that insider trading regulation under 10b-5 somehow
survived this retrenchment at all. In Chiarella, the Supreme Court
scolded the Second Circuit for its failure to restrain the
overbreadth of “abstain or disclose,” but then plastered together
the doctrinal edifice under the revisionist banner of fiduciary
responsibility.40 The fraud fiction thus continued. As a result,
fiduciaries vis-a-vis the issuer had a duty to abstain or disclose
material nonpublic information to marketplace traders; others
not. That naturally raised concerns about tippers and tippees,
on securities issues, including cases he was working on. See Margaret V.
Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: The Creation of a
Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. Rev. 777 (1997). Loss, in turn, was by the late
1960s working on a massive project to codify the federal securities laws and
thus an interest in having the Second Circuit case law be as much in harmony
with his proposals as possible.
38 Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A PostChiarella Restatement, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1982); LANGEVOORT, INSIDER
TRADING, supra, sec. 2:2 at 2-5; see also James Park, Rule 10b-5 and the Rise of
the Unjust Enrichment Principle, 60 Duke L.J. 345 (2010).
39 See Donald C. Langevoort, From Texas Gulf Sulphur to Chiarella: A Tale of
Two Duties, 71 SMU L. Rev. 835 (2018). The Second Circuit opinion in
Chiarella was actually a fairly nuanced holding, contrary to what Justice
Powell makes it seem in the Supreme Court’s opinion. Id. at 845-46.
40 Id. at 845-48.
11
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because the latter were outsiders, not fiduciaries. Even though
there was no tipping at issue in Chiarella, Justice Powell dropped a
footnote to assuage this fear saying that tippees may inherit the
tipper’s fiduciary duty by becoming “participants after the fact” in
the tipper’s fiduciary breach, i.e., co-venturers with the insider.41
So when Dirks came to the Court three years later, Justice
Powell quickly sought control of the case and insisted that it
should simply follow his Chiarella footnote. Raymond Dirks had
received material nonpublic information about a massive fraud at
a well-known issuer from some whistleblowers and helped them
publicly expose the fraud, though not before causing his clients to
dump the stock before its collapse. Still feeling some sting from
Chiarella, the SEC (unwisely) applied an expansive approach to
tipper-tippee liability in its proceeding against Dirks that
essentially made the fiduciary duty of the source run to all who

This footnote itself has an interesting history. The co-venturer concept,
which stresses that tippee culpability is entirely derivative of the tipper’s
fiduciary duty, was recognized in a Second Circuit decision construing insider
liability under state corporation law (the law of Florida). Schein v. Chasen,
478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973). But that decision was vacated by the United
States Supreme Court on grounds that the issue of first impression was for
the Florida Supreme Court to decide. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 586
(1974). The Second Circuit decision is interesting because it draws a clear
distinction between the right approach to liability under state corporation
law and under Rule 10b-5, the latter being more expansive. Presumably
because the Second Circuit decision was formally vacated (and perhaps
because it had distinguished this approach from how 10b-5 should be
interpreted), it was not cited directly in the Chiarella footnote—just a
reference to an American Bar Association Committee letter, which had drawn
from Schein v. Chasen. What the court in Schein was describing was a form of
civil conspiracy (or more precisely, a conspiracy to breach a fiduciary duty)
arising from the formation of a “common enterprise” to exploit a fiduciary
obligation. 478 F.2d at 822. To this end, the court also drew from the
Restatement of Agency 2d. sec. 312 (1958), which provides for third party
liability for intentionally causing or assisting a fiduciary breach.
41
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came in possession of the secret with knowledge of its
confidential origins, and a divided D.C. Circuit agreed.42
Powell was not impressed. We know that not simply
because of the Dirks opinion itself, but because of some
remarkable documents that Adam Pritchard found some time ago
in Powell’s archived materials—opinion drafts, marginal notes,
and inter-chamber correspondence. From these, as Pritchard
shows, we can piece together how the Dirks test came to be.43 In
the earliest drafts, Powell had two clear objectives: to tether the
test for tipper-tippee liability to his Chiarella footnote, and to
assure that the test would not unduly chill the bona fide
interactions between insiders and market analysts that he saw as
necessary to market efficiency.44 These first drafts of the opinion
were straight-forward, simply requiring a court to find that the
tipper’s purpose in passing on the information involved disloyalty
to the issuer and its shareholders, which would not be the case if
the insider was merely careless in divulging some bit of material
information to an analyst, thinking it immaterial or already public.
To this, Powell and his clerk added contrasting illustrations of bad
motivations: quid pro quo tips for the pecuniary benefit of the
tipper, and “gift” tips specifically intended by the tipper to benefit
Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. Rev.
857 (2015). The entire Dirks file is now available on-line via the Lewis Powell
Collection at the Washington & Lee Law School library website (hereinafter
as “File at –“). I have previously drawn from these documents in a number of
writings; E.g., Langevoort, Fine Distinctions, supra, at 453; Michael Guttentag
has engaged in a close reading of Dirks in light of them as well, identifying
four underlying purposes in what Dirks says—none of which, he argues,
bears its weight today. Guttentag, supra, at 526-35.
44 His clerk assigned to the case, Jim Browning (now a federal judge), was
much more aggressive at the outset, trying to get the Justice to at least
consider either no tippee liability at all, or even no 10b-5 insider trading
liability at all, Chiarella notwithstanding. File at 8-11. Browning, in turn,
drew heavily in his memos and drafts from the scholarship of Michael Dooley
and Frank Easterbrook. Browning graduated from the University of Virginia
School of Law, where Dooley taught.
42
43
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the tippee. The latter are the words, unchanged throughout all
the later drafts, on which Martoma ultimately turns.
This test was apparently pleasing to Powell—in essence, he
was simply saying that the breach of duty on which tipper liability
is premised is the duty of loyalty as opposed to the duty of care.
There was nothing about making the test particularly demanding
beyond this, even with respect to securities analysts.45 He quickly
got three other votes to overturn the SEC. Somewhat resistant
was Justice O’Connor, who sent Powell a memo saying that she
objected to his focus on the tipper’s purpose, which she thought
much too subjective.46 She wanted him to substitute a
requirement that the SEC or prosecutors prove up an actual
benefit to the tipper—an objective test.
From his notes, Powell seems reluctant; as a former
corporate lawyer, it was natural for him to think of fiduciary duty
in terms of an attitude of loyalty and good faith.47 And fiduciary
duty law has never required an actual benefit to the fiduciary or
harm to the beneficiary; quite the opposite. O’Connor, the former
trial judge in Arizona, was coming from another place entirely,
concerned about evidence. Compromise ensued,48 which
produced a semantic mess. To preserve his initial approach,
Powell kept most of his language about purpose, along with all his
illustrations. But he also inserted the requested language about
proof of actual benefit, without much effort to reconcile the two,
which if anything suggests (as Pritchard argues) that both
Pritchard, supra, at 861-63.
Id. at 865-66.
47 At first glance, Powell may be read to welcome O’Connor’s suggestion (he
writes back about her “quite constructive” memo) but his notes on her memo
twice say “no” to what she is pushing. Id. at 866. More importantly, his edits
to the opinion by no means jettison his preferred purpose-based standard.
Quite the contrary is true.
48 The draft with the O’Connor revisions can be found in File at 371. A
heavily marked up page shows how much Powell was trying to keep as much
of his approach as possible. File at 385-86.
45
46
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motivation and benefit-in-fact may be required, even though
neither justice was advocating that dualism49 It was in doing this,
relatively late in the drafting process, that Powell also added
reference to the possibility of a reputational benefit, presumably
to take in the more speculative possibility of gains to the tipper
that may (or may not) be anticipated later on even if nothing is
delivered at the moment.50
My point here is not to suggest that these early drafts and
private letters are authoritative as to Dirks’ precedential meaning,
any more than the private explanations of a legislative drafter
determine the meaning of a statute.51 But cases like Obus and
Martoma explicitly struggle with the overlapping references to
objective and subjective benefit, so the back story at least helps
explain the confusion.52

B. Martoma and the Mighty Comma

Pritchard, supra, at 870.
I suspect that Powell feared that the insistence on objective evidence of
pecuniary gain might be taken too far, and thus made clear by reference to
reputation that an inference of possible future benefit would suffice. Powell
also struggled (and never really resolved) with the overlapping relationship
between his duty-based approach to tipper liability and the separate 10b-5
requirement of scienter. This becomes even more vexing when he turns to
tippee state of mind, discussed infra.
51 Pritchard agrees. Id. at 874-75, citing Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History,
108 Yale L.J. 1311 (1999).
52 The best practical reconciliation I can think of is that the government must
show that there was some disloyalty vis-à-vis the issuer or source by offering
objective direct or circumstantial evidence of potential gain from which to
infer subjective intent to benefit. The real question is whether this evidence
indicates, at the time of the tip, the tipper could reasonably expect to benefit.
This is important, because as courts have repeatedly pointed out, the very
nature of reputational and sometimes even pecuniary benefits is that their
value usually comes much later, and maybe never.
49
50
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Back to the question: under Dirks, is the intent to make a gift
of the information disloyal per se, or is that category limited to
meaningfully close relationships with family and friends, for
which it may be said—as is repeatedly emphasized by the
Supreme Court in Salman—that tipping someone close to you is
like the tipper trading on his own and then giving the proceeds to
the loved one? I will come back to this simile in a bit.
Chief Judge Katzman’s majority opinion in Martoma is a
hyper-close reading of Dirks’ text (almost as if it were a statute
being interpreted by a strict originalist) in support of a standalone “intent to benefit the tippee” route to tipper-tippee liability.
In so doing, Martoma seizes on language in Dirks that had been in
plain sight but largely ignored in tipping jurisprudence up until
then.53 The analytical progression in the key paragraph in Dirks
says, as discussed above, that while purpose may be the ultimate
question, objective proof as to benefit is required.54 It then refers
to pecuniary and reputational benefit as two ways to do this
(oddly using “i.e.” rather than “e.g.”) After a citation on that point
to some secondary authority, it gives examples for when the
inference of such benefit is proper, which had been in multiple
earlier drafts: “there may be a relationship between the insider
and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or
an intention to benefit the particular recipient.”55 Martoma seizes
on the comma in the middle of this sentence to claim that the
Court is offering two distinct routes to proving a tip, the latter
being a simple intention to benefit the tippee without the need for
any pre-existing relationship.56 Only in the next sentence—with
Not surprisingly, Martoma claims that this language is familiar, put to use
in SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1998) and even Newman. 894 F.3d
at 74, 77. But in neither does the court put much if any weight on it as a
distinct route to liability.
54 463 U.S. at 664.
55 Id. (emphasis added).
56 This reading makes the reference to relationships at the beginning of the
sentence applicable only to what comes before the comma.
53
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the word “also” to suggest that this is additional, not defining or
limiting—is there any specific reference to friends or family or (in
the sentence that follows that one) the foggy point about such tips
being the equivalent of trading followed by a gift of the proceeds.
What the panel majority is doing here is clinging
desperately to Justice Powell’s original focus on the tipper’s
purpose—the particular words that are important to Katzman are
ones that appeared in draft opinions in Dirks early on, well before
O’Connor. From the archives we see that the distinct idea of an
intentional tip to give someone a marketplace advantage as a clear
breach of loyalty stated in the first draft and Powell’s
accompanying notes without any reference to family or friends.57
With all the subsequent changes that go on elsewhere in the
drafting, that distinctive language about the purposeful tip
remained. In dissent, Judge Pooler does just the opposite: seizing
on the handful of O’Connor inspired snippets that reject purpose
in favor actual benefit, objectively demonstrated. She is insistent
that gift benefit arguments be accompanied by a convincing (if
often circumstantial) story about the potential for some kind of
gain, such as the inference that giving a tip to a close family
member or friend will naturally enrich all those in the
relationship. She wants nothing to do with purpose as such.
The Dirks Court’s failure to reconcile the two inconsistent
ideas explains much about Martoma’s difficulty. It comes down to
whether one can fairly read the insistence on benefit-in-fact as
entirely evidentiary in assessing the presence of disloyalty, or
something more dispositive. How much did Powell give away to
O’Connor, in other words? Different sentences or fragments
suggest different answers to this question, which is not surprising
given that Powell was trying to satisfy O’Connor without silencing

57

See pp. – supra.
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his own strong views about the motivational nature of fiduciary
duty and good faith.58
Textualism aside, is it cogent and sufficiently compelling to
proscribe deliberate gift tips outside the circle of family and
friends as breaches of loyalty? Commenting on Obus and
Newman, Pritchard says no;59 in contrast, Donna Nagy and Joan
Heminway both say yes in part by reference to more recent
Delaware fiduciary duty case law,60 which puts in the category of
disloyalty and bad faith actions deliberately taken without regard
for the interests of the corporation. Even without such resort, I
think that there is benefit whenever fiduciaries takes something
valuable as their own to do with as they please without serving
their master (the issuer or source), regardless of what they
ultimately choose to do. The exercise of dominion is itself a form of
(unjust) enrichment.61 Judge Rakoff seems to agree, saying in
Pinto-Thomaz that the “use of the term ‘personal purpose’ or
‘personal advantage’ [in Dirks] could have averted subsequent

I see little in Salman to resolve any of this confusion. Salman quotes Dirks
extensively, including both Powell and O’Conner inspired sentences as if
there is no tension. Curiously, the Court puts the distinct “intent to benefit
the tippee” language in italics, without explanation.
Judge Pooler in
Martoma I (see 869 F.3d at 86-87) and others note that the government in
Salman made broad arguments about the meaning of tip and the role of
personal benefit, which the Court sets forth. The opinion then immediately
says that the case can be resolved on narrow grounds—the nature of gifts in
a family setting. She suggests that this is an implicit repudiation of the
government’s argument. I don’t see it as such, but rather the common
approach of not seeking to resolve doctrinal issues beyond what is necessary
to answer the question posed by the grant of certiorari. The Court gives no
reasons why it would reject the government’s position.
59 Pritchard, supra, at 869-74.
60 Nagy, supra, at 42; Heminway, supra, at 90-91.
61 Jill Fisch seems to be making a similar point about the tipper’s increase in
utility. See Jill Fisch, Family Ties: Salman and the Scope of Insider Trading, 69
Stan. L. Rev. Online 46, 51 (2016).
58
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confusion;”62 the stand-alone inference, in other words, coheres
well enough with the Dirks Court’s intent.
Martoma also makes a structural argument. It dismisses the
idea that a deeply meaningful relationship between tipper and
tippee is necessary by reference to the two other (less
controversial) kinds of personal benefit, pecuniary and
reputational. If the former can be satisfied by as little as a couple
of lobsters, theater tickets or jars of honey from the tippee, or the
hope of a bright future, it is not doing all that much work.63 So,
according to the panel, it hardly makes sense to be so elastic there
yet arbitrarily strict for pure gifts. But this proves too much. I am
fairly sure that Judge Parker in Newman would have liked, if he
could, to attach his requirement of “objective and consequential”
pecuniary-like expectation to all three prongs, not just gifts. To
him, I suspect, a jar of honey for a big tip shouldn’t suffice to
create a co-venture either. And I’m not sure that the Supreme
Court would disagree if faced with those facts (as opposed to the
egregious family sharing plan in Salman).
Reputational benefit deserves more thought than it has
been given—this remains the most undertheorized form of
personal benefit. Powell adds it to the Dirks opinion relatively late
as part of the O’Connor edits, perhaps to make clear (as against
what O’Conner was pushing) that personal benefit does not have
to involve an immediate or certain payoff to the tipper; it is
enough to reasonably hope that something good may come as a
thank you kind of payback later on. We are back to purpose, in
other words. No prior relationship is necessary here: consider a
hypothetical where a young investment banker brazenly seeks out
a big-name hedge fund manager whom he has never met and
simply delivers a valuable tip with the words “you’re welcome.”

62
63

352 F. Supp.3d at 299.
See United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2018).
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Given how the favor bank works on Wall Street,64 this might be
characterized as seeking a reputational benefit, and given the
cronyism involved, certainly should be.65 On the other hand,
hoping for something of significant value in return may seem
delusional, failing Judge Pooler’s reasonable expectations
approach. So while a sensibly broad approach to reputational
benefit would obviate the need to address my hypo as a form of
gift-giving, I think the stand-alone intent to benefit standard is
better aligned with what animates the inclusion of reputation in
the personal benefit analysis. Gratuitous tips may be good
conversation starters, with the relationship coming later.
There is one more textual clue in Dirks that bolsters the
Martoma conclusion, though the panel didn’t stress it. Toward the
very end of the Supreme Court’s opinion, in concluding that there
was no breach for personal benefit by the whistleblowing
insiders—which resolves the case—it says “nor did they make a
gift of valuable information to Dirks.”66 If a meaningfully close
personal relationship was essential to gift-giving, the Court
presumably would have noted that, because there was no such
relationship. This language, which seems to admit of the
possibility of a gift benefit in a tip to an investment professional
with whom they had no prior relationship, much less a close
personal one, thus fits better with Martoma’s reading.
This, however, brings us to the two “friends and family”
sentences in Dirks, and the thought that tipping friends and family
members “resembles” the insider trading and then giving the
Tom Wolfe’s memorable image from The Bonfires of the Vanities (1987),
about doing favors on Wall Street without asking for anything in return, just
with the hope/expectation that something good will come of it down the line.
See Coffee, supra.
65 See Donald C. Langevoort, Informational Cronyism, 69 Stan. L. Rev. Online
37, 39 (2016). For a corruption-based theory of insider trading, see Sung Hui
Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 928 (2014).
66 646 U.S. at 665-66.
64
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proceeds to them.67 The analogy is only superficially helpful,
because the same thing could be said about many tips; indeed, in
early drafts of the opinion this form of “indirect benefit” was
invoked to justify the entire idea behind the personal benefit test,
not just the gift prong. If the idea is that the gains to the tippee
will somehow come back to enrich the tipper because of the close
relationship, that seems both speculative and poorly defined.
Think of the many cases that could not easily be categorized—a
tip to the portfolio manager of the endowment fund of her alma
mater. There are just too many forms the relationship between
tipper and tippee can take for the analogy to bear much weight in
disposing of cases.
That said, I have to concede that the two sentences have
come to be part of the canon of tipper-tippee law, and not so
easily by-passed. Salman jumped right to them to conclude that
the gift-giving language in Dirks needs no further elaboration
making them the rationale for rejecting Newman’s tightening. And
as Jack Coffee points out, if we take the facts in Martoma (ignoring
the pecuniary quid pro quo), it is very hard to see what Dr. Gilman
did as “resembling” trading massively for his own account and
gifting the proceeds to a hedge fund by way of Mathew Martoma.68
The friends and family qualifier to gift benefit has been around,
used and quoted long enough for it to have taken on a life of its
own, pre-dating Newman and its gloss. So while I have come to be
In the evolution of the Dirks opinion, the idea and language about friends
and family, including the simile, is taken almost verbatim from an opinion
piece in the Legal Times by Leonard Chazen that appeared roughly at the
time the case was being argued. Chazen, Dirks Presents Unique Corporate,
Social Issues, Legal Times of Washington, March 14, 1983, at 14, 18. For a
while, the draft opinion gave Chazen credit for the concept with an extensive
quotation, but Powell later directed his clerk to remove the citation on
grounds that reliance on such media commentary might not be appropriate.
File at 225. Much the same idea was also expressed in the ABA letter cited in
the Chiarella footnote (see note – supra), with reference to friends, family “or
others;” this cite was eliminated in editing as well. File at 216.
68 Coffee, supra.
67
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persuaded that Martoma’s reading probably makes better sense of
the law of fiduciary responsibility on which insider trading theory
is grounded, the more conventional reading of gift benefit—
bolstered by Salman’s fascination with the simile—may be the
more likely one, at least outside the Second Circuit or until the
next stealth overruling.

III. TWO THEORIES, CONFLICTING PRINCIPLES

“Essentially, insider trading is a variation of the species of fraud
known as embezzlement, which is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary
as ‘[t]he fraudulent taking of personal property with which one has
been entrusted, especially as a fiduciary.’ If the embezzler, instead of
trading on the information himself passes on the information to
someone who knows it is misappropriated” information but still
intends to use it in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
that ‘tippee’ is likewise liable, just as any knowing receiver of stolen
goods would be”—Judge Rakoff in Pinto-Thomaz69

Judge Rakoff has for some time now expressed the wish that
insider trading law be thoroughly grounded in misappropriation,
from which a simpler “stolen goods” approach to tipper-tippee
liability would naturally follow. He has expressed no affection for
the classical “abstain or disclose” theory, from which the Dirks
test was derived. Yet today, Dirks controls under both theories.
Perhaps that is one of the unnecessary complications some courts
have fostered. Again, we have to go back in time.

352 F. Supp. 3d at 295-96. Previously, see SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp.3d
558, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)(Rakoff, J.: insider trading “is a form of cheating, of
using purloined or embezzled information to gain an unfair trading
advantage”).
69
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A. More Doctrinal History

The federal securities law of insider trading through (and
including) the retrenchment in Chiarella and Dirks was entirely
about the duties to abstain or disclose that traders with an
informational
advantage
owe
to
others
trading
contemporaneously in the securities markets. The Supreme Court
held that such a duty exists when the defendant is a fiduciary who
trades or tips, because others trading in the marketplace can be
seen as the beneficiaries of that trust. This is the classical theory,
for which Dirks sets the rule for tipper-tippee liability.
When Chiarella was being briefed and argued before the
Supreme Court, the Solicitor General’s office abandoned the more
expansive conceptions of duty that flourished in the aftermath of
the Second Circuit’s Texas Gulf Sulphur decision and tried to get
the Court to buy into a narrower framework, which it presumably
thought had a better chance before an increasingly conservative
lineup of justices.70 The SG’s approach made the law turn on
misappropriation, which was presented in two distinct versions in
the government’s brief. One retained the focus on protecting
contemporaneous marketplace traders by imposing a duty to
abstain or disclose to the market anytime the information has
been misappropriated, whether by breach of fiduciary duty or
See Brief for the United States, 1979 WL 213521. Until shortly before
briefing and argument, Frank Easterbrook was the Deputy Solicitor General
to whom those who eventually handled the case for the SG’s office (Stephen
Shapiro and Kenneth Geller, who subsequently became leaders of the
Supreme Court bar) reported. Before leaving, Easterbrook took the lead in
urging a property-based approach to insider trading. See SEC Historical
Soceity oral history, Jan. 2011, http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f4405e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/oralhistories/20110113_Easterbrook_Frank_T.pdf. The connection between the
property-rights misappropriation approach to insider trading and
Easterbrook’s influential writings on the subject later on is palpable. See
Langevoort, Tale of Two Duties, supra, at 846-47.
70
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mere theft. The other was to find deception in the breach of
entrustment itself, where the trader is pretending to be a faithful
fiduciary to the source of the information, but in fact acting
disloyally. In Chiarella, the majority accepted neither argument
on the merits, finding them insufficiently charged below,
therefore leaving both for future consideration if and when
properly pled and charged. For the time being, at least, fiduciary
duty was it. In dissent, Chief Justice Burger said he would apply
the market-facing disclosure approach to misappropriation to
sustain Chiarella’s conviction. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Stevens agreed with the majority but said encouraging things
about the fraud on the source argument for future cases.
The
Supreme
Court
eventually
embraced
the
misappropriation theory a decade and a half later in United States
v. O’Hagan.71 But which version? The Second Circuit’s early cases
supporting misappropriation were somewhat ambiguous on this,
not seeming to put much weight on (or even noticing) much in the
way of substantive distinction.72 Since then, however, it has
become clear that it was not Burger’s conception73 but rather the
argument that Justice Stevens liked. By feigning fidelity, the
misappropriator deceives the source of the information, taking
advantage of misplaced trust. To experts in white collar crime,
this version of misappropriation bears a close family resemblance
to the “honest services” idea that for so long drove many high521 U.S. 642 (1997).
In the first Second Circuit decisions applying the misappropriation theory,
the “Burger” and “Stevens” approaches to the theory were intermingled. E.g.,
United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032-33 (2d Cir. 1986)—which,
by the way, Jed Rakoff argued on the defense side. It appears that Justice
Powell considered the misappropriation theory an invalid application of
Section 10(b), but left the Court shortly before he would have been able to
reject it in Carpenter. A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan, Agency Law
and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 13
(1998).
73 Contrary to Judge Rakoff’s attribution, see Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp.3d at
297.
71
72
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profile mail and wire fraud prosecutions, which might explain its
quick take-up among prosecutors and judges at the time.74 The
biggest practical difference between the two theories has to do
with the “mere theft” of information. The Burger approach
readily includes all purloined information within the duty to
disclose, no matter how obtained, while the fraud on the source
theory only kicks in when the theft takes a deceptive form (like
embezzlement).75 As the quotes from Judge Rakoff show, it is
tempting today to treat misappropriation as the theory of insider
trading, expressing the first principles from which insider trading
doctrine should follow. After all, most all classical cases are also
misappropriation case (though not vice versa). Indeed, Rakoff
seems anxious to throw the classical theory into deep storage76
It is also tempting to speak of misappropriation in propertylike terms,77 although this steps into intellectual quicksand. The
resemblance to embezzlement has been noted in the case law for
decades (pointedly made in the government’s brief in Chiarella),
About the same time as Chiarella was decided, not yet Judge Rakoff wrote
an extensive survey of the history and use of the mail and wire fraud
statutes: Jed Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 Duq. L. Rev.
771 (1980); on the subsequent evolution of mail fraud as applied to insider
trading, see William K.S. Wang, Application of Federal Mail and Wire Fraud
Statutes to Criminal Liability for Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70
U. Miami L. Rev. 220 (2015).
75 This is what made a hacking SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009),
involving insider trading via hacking.
76 Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp.3d at 297 n.3 (“While the ‘classical theory’ may
still be occasionally employed even today, it is hard to imagine an insider
trading case that does not fit comfortably within the confines of the
misappropriation theory”). For an argument for a misappropriation-based
unified theory of insider trading, see Zachary Gubler, A Unified Theory of
Insider Trading Law, 105 Geo. L.J. 1235 (2017).
77 Judge Ralph Winter played a considerable judicial role in translating an
academic theory to doctrine. See his concurring and dissenting opinion on
the application of the misappropriation theory in United States v. Chestman,
947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991(en banc). He sought to draw a line between
business-related misappropriation and more informal settings in a case
involving a family-controlled business..
74
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but of course embezzlement takes money or property away from
its rightful owner; insider trading is merely the unauthorized use
of the information, often without any measurable harm to its
owner.78 To be sure, there might be a threat to the value of the
information in a given case—and so good reasons to proscribe the
misconduct. But ultimately the misappropriation theory is more
about the abuse of trust in the sharing of secrets, applicable to
settings where the “owner” of the information has invested in the
gathering valuable information that has been entrusted to agents
of the firm, but extending well beyond. It is more contract than
property, and even then, can be as much in the hands of the courts
as a matter of law (fiduciary duty) than expressed intent of the
parties. Still, the embezzlement and stolen goods rhetoric
persists.79 It appeals especially to conservative-leaning academics
and judges because it appears to privatize the interests at stake,
reducing judicial discretion to the identification of pre-existing
protectable economic interests rather than searching for more
public-regarding duties.
The case law on tipper-tippee liability under the
misappropriation theory took a solid turn the “stolen goods”
Rational insider traders take pains to conceal their trading from all but a
close circle, if that, because leakage erodes the trading advantage.
79 There is also a conceptual difference.
The Burger-endorsed
misappropriation theory was grounded in investor protection and avoiding
marketplace abuse by embezzlers and thieves. By contrast, the theory
underlying fraud on the source in its pure form is the protection of the
owner’s property interest in exclusive use of the secrets from embezzlement
and deceptive thievery. The first makes insider trading a matter of public
law; the second smacks of private law. I suspect that many judges who apply
the misappropriation theory as we know it today instinctively think of it as
grounded in investor protection, in the spirit of Chief Justice Burger. Justice
Ginsburg tries hard in O’Hagan to make this connection, though formally
adhering to the victimization of the source alone. See Donna Nagy, Reframing
the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O’Hagan
Suggestion, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 1223 (1998). Rakoff can be read as doing so as
well. But there are profoundly different implications to following the
property rights view, including about the treatment of tippers and tippees.
78
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direction in the 1990s. Both the SEC and criminal prosecutors
took the litigation position that personal benefit was required
only in classical cases, which found some (though not uniform)
support.80 This distinction came to matter more and more as
misappropriation grew in reach. The pivotal case was United
States v. Libera,81 involving “tippers” who worked at the plant
where Business Week magazine was printed and distributed, and
who—for very little, if any, compensation—delivered advance
copies to recipients who used the advantage to buy and sell stocks
mentioned favorably in the investment column. The Second
Circuit affirmed 10b-5 liability in a striking opinion written by
Ralph Winter, rejecting defendants’ main argument that the
workers did not actually even know what the recipients intended
to do with the information (i.e., it wasn’t obviously a tip to
facilitate trading because the recipients could have had many
reasons for wanting an advance look). Judge Winter anticipates
Rakoff with repeated references to embezzlement and stolen
information, and firmly embraces a property rights approach.82
Misuse of someone else’s information was enough, apparently,
and as far as what was in it for the workers, the panel said simply
that “it may be presumed that the tippee’s interest in the
information is, in the contemporary jargon, not for nothing.” Dirks
is cited, but reference to personal benefit was conspicuously
absent. A few years later, in United States v. Falcone,83 the court
See SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); SEC v. Willis, 777 F.
Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The First Circuit a few years later read Second
Circuit law as not requiring benefit. SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68 (1st Cir.
2000).
81 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993).
82 Id. at 600. The court does insist on a fiduciary breach by the insider and
that the tippee know or have reason to know of the breach. In that sense,
Dirks has an influence, but personal benefit is not part of it.
83 257 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001). Falcone (written by now Justice Sotomayor)
seems clear to me that there are separate and distinct tests for tipper-tippee
liability for classical and misappropriation cases, with personal benefit
relegated to the former. Id. at 231-32.
80
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reaffirmed Libera in concluding that nothing in the Supreme
Court’s intervening O’Hagan decision in any way undercut its
reasoning. The exclusion of personal benefit from the analysis
was even more palpable in Falcone.84 Misappropriation law was
heading in its own direction, hastening Dirks’ demise. Trial judges
were confused.85
Yet that turn in the maze led to a dead end. Obus, Newman
and Martoma now all say without hesitation that the Dirks test for
tipper-tippee liability applies equally to classical and
misappropriation insider trading cases, as if the stolen goods line
of cases never happened. Obus (which Newman and Martoma
simply follow on this point) cites Falcone alone for this
proposition,86 even though Falcone reads as just the opposite. In
this sense, Obus put a sudden stop to one wobble in the tippertippee case law, but set another in motion as district judges faced
up to the challenges of applying the personal benefit test in the
wave of hedge fund trader prosecutions that were cresting at the
time, including the prosecutions leading to Newman and Martoma.
In contrast to Libera, Falcone and other cases distancing misappropriation
cases from Dirks, an Eleventh Circuit case squarely adopting a unified
standard noted that Dirks could be rendered moot simply by avoiding the
lesser-included classical theory in a charge, and it seemed too consequential
a holding to allow that to happen. SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).
85 For an expression of angst about this direction the Second Circuit law was
taking at that time, see SEC v. Smath, 277 F. Supp.2d 186 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
86 693 F.3d at 286. Neither Falcone nor Libera says explicitly that they are
rejecting personal benefit. But both (especially Falcone) subdivide the
discussion of tippee liability with personal benefit playing a significant role in
the classical context, while there is no mention of it in the separate
articulation of tipper-tippee liability for misappropriation..
An SEC
administrative law judge took the implausible view that the latter omission is
only because it was not something that needed to be mentioned by the court
of appeals. In the Matter of Boylan & Ruggieri, 112 SEC Docket 2469 (2015).
On review by the Commission, dismissal of the SEC’s case by the ALJ was
affirmed by an equally divided Commission, which at the time consisted of
only two Commissioners. Commissioner Stein disagreed and would have
overturned the ruling; Commissioner Piowar voted to affirm, but on grounds
that no tip was satisfactorily proven, not on personal benefit grounds.
84
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B. Dirks as a Workhorse

“Anyone who thinks that the stock market is a level playing field
obviously has no contact with reality.”—Judge Rakoff, cautioning
prosecutors from the bench in Pinto-Thomaz87

Rakoff is right, of course. But insider trading law has never
really promised a level playing field. There was a brief period of
time after Texas Gulf Sulphur when it might have been so read, but
that passed surprisingly quickly. By the mid-1970s, even the SEC
had rejected strict egalitarianism as bad law and bad policy; the
courts in the Second Circuit distanced themselves from it
unrealistic implications as well. As I have written elsewhere
recently in tracing this history, by the time of Chiarella, the
equality principle had mainly become a bogeyman for Wall Street
to use in pushing back against insider trading law’s reach, though
I concede (from personal recollection) that some enforcers at the
time and even to this day still yearn for a restoration.88
Since that time, insider trading law has been read mainly for
the work it does. Most courts and commentators treat the
Supreme Court’s decision as straight-forward and (assuming they
take it seriously) functional in design—about sorting the
circumstances in which outsiders gain an informational advantage
into the good and the bad. As courts up through Obus made light
of personal benefit, critics saw this as a perversion of the Court’s
original intent that could undermine the work it is supposed to be
Lexicology: The Insider Trading Mess that Congress is Trying to Fix, Paul
Hastings
LLP,
May
16,,
2019,
available
at
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=266c1283-c920-4b56a508-667e53e518c9.
88 See Langevoort, Two Duties, supra at 840-43, 846.
87
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doing, although for most of that time neither the SEC nor
prosecutors were targeting market professionals in a way that
pushed hard on these efficiency concerns. With the hedge fund
cases, that changed; Newman and its enthusiasts were
resurrecting Dirks not only in form but in function. Two recent
empirical studies of stock trading by market professionals
determine that the Newman decision was followed by a noticeable
step-up in aggressiveness by savvy traders in the form of larger
orders and larger trading duration in the face of informational
asymmetry.89
The stock story is that Dirks is all about market efficiency
and (to some at least) protecting property rights in private
information. As to the former, legitimate information search
should not be chilled by the threat of liability; the elements of
tipper-tippee liability should thus work to protect analysts and
professional traders. As we have seen, this idea gets prominence
in both Chiarella and (especially) Dirks, so there is no doubt it was
important to Justice Powell and his colleagues in the majority of
those two cases. But it is also important not to overstate this. The
Court had ample opportunity to restrain or reject insider trading
law and tipper-tippee liability much more radically in the name of
efficiency, but didn’t. Fiduciary obligation seemed to matter a lot
to Powell,90 even though the Court had said just a couple of years

See Manesh Patel, Does Insider Trading Law Change Behavior? An
Empirical Analysis, 53 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 447 (2019); Marcin Kacperczyk &
Emiliano Pagnotta, Becker Meets Kyle: Inside Insider Trading, Aug. 2019,
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3142006.
The latter authors also show that in the few years before Newman, with the
arrival of Preet Bharara as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District, there were
more cautious trading patterns. Id. at 5.
90 I have imagined in earlier work a conversation between Powell and
William Cary, the SEC Chair who inspired the Commission to go after insider
trading as a form of (constructive) fraud. Cary’s opinion in the Cady Roberts
case was repeatedly cited in both Chiarella and Dirks, in a very supportive
tone that suggests that Powell was a believer in what Cary was trying to
89
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earlier that fiduciary duties were for state corporation law to
enforce, not 10b-5.91 As noted earlier, his explicit concern with
market efficiency was real but mainly about avoiding liability for
carelessness as opposed to disloyalty in the course of insideranalyst meetings. Stronger readings of Dirks about promoting
efficiency may project more onto the Court’s intent than
necessary.92
This is why the portion of Newman at issue in Salman
gathered so little concern from commentators. Salman involved a
market professional, but as intra-family tipper, not tippee.
Newman’s point—in the selective disclosure context—was to
warn prosecutors away from making “friend” claims too liberally
to evade the personal benefit filter, which the Court in Salman
easily cabined by focusing on the stench of intra-family cronyism.
Even Richard Epstein writes that Salman was an easy case for the
government under his neoconservative assessment of tippertippee law.
By contrast, Martoma is much more threatening insofar as it
rejects the family and friends collar entirely when there is
sufficient (objective) evidence that the purpose of the tip was to
enrich the recipient. I have already suggested a reading of
Powell’s opinion that permits precisely that, even as it takes us
into more contestable territory about selective disclosure. Before
we go there, however, we should take stock of the high-level
public policy at issue as it has been used to critique the wobble
from Obus to Martoma.

accomplish, so long as read through the lens of fiduciary obligation. See
Langevoort, Fine Distinctions, supra, at 460-61.
91 Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
92 As to Justice O’Connor, her suggestion to objectify the inquiry was
seemingly to make the trial judge’s job easier Pritchard, supra, at 866 (“I am
not sure about what will be gained from an inquiry into intent, but from my
past experience on the bench, I know that a great deal of time will be lost!”)
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Deciding doctrinal issues by reference to first principles is
hard without a clear theory of what those principles should be. A
fairness-based, level playing field principle is sometimes put forth
in favor of aggressive regulation (which almost automatically
signals disdain for Dirks and Newman), but notoriously difficult to
substantiate via hard evidence. More sophisticated versions focus
on market liquidity and cost of capital. For example, Merritt Fox,
Larry Glosten and Gabe Rauterberg argue that insider trading
doctrine should be premised on achieving an optimal balance
between encouraging bona fide fundamental market research and
minimizing the adverse selection problems (liquidity costs) that
come when uninformed traders fear that they can be exploited by
informed traders.93 This leads them to conclude that, contrary to
Obus et al., there should be a stark difference between classical
and misappropriation cases as to personal benefit. In terms of
Dirks’ expressed imperative of not chilling analyst information
search, which is presumably a virtue of a personal benefit
standard, that applies well to interactions between analysts and
insiders (classical theory) but not to information held secretly by
persons other than the issuer (misappropriation).94 Analysts
mainly focus on the former, and not the latter. Besides suggesting
this wrong turn on the road to Martoma, they argue that
deliberate issuer-authorized tips to analysts should be banned
whichever theory applies—the adverse selection problem
dominates the need to encourage research once the problem of
inadvertent leakage is addressed.
The “alt” theory in insider trading, as noted, it is to protect
the property rights belonging to the owner of the information
See Fox et al., supra.
See also Merritt B. Fox & George Tepe, Personal Benefit Has No Place in
Misappropriation Tipping Cases, 71 SMU L. Rev. 767 (2018)(arguing that the
law is not so clear that further change could not take place to restore the
view that the Dirks test be confined to classical cases). In many ways they
anticipate the Blaszczak case, discussed infra.
93
94
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from embezzlement or its equivalents. Judge Winter’s opinions in
Chestman and Libera took this on as their mission, as we saw.95 A
fundamental implication of the property rights idea is that the
owner gets to do with the information as it wishes, free of
government meddling at least so far as the securities laws are
concerned. A large body of scholarship (mostly conservative)
agrees, with Frank Easterbrook as an early and influential
proponent. While an early version of this said that there was no
need for federal regulation at all—owners can protect themselves
using common law agency, fiduciary, tort, contract and property
principles—that idea has faded in favor of seeing insider trading
law as a useful federal law tool for sanctioning informational
embezzlers. But recall that Winter wanted no place for personal
benefit.
In his commentary on Newman and Martoma I, by
contrast, Jon Macey argues that a personal benefit requirement is
crucial to cement into place a strict property-rights/privateordering approach. He thus treats the Dirks test (including
personal benefit strictly applied) as a necessary protection for
dissemination of information that serves the owner’s private selfinterest.96

See pp. --- supra.
See Macey, supra; see also Jonathan Macey, The Genius of the Personal
Benefit Test, 69 Stan. L. Rev. Online 64 (2016). Macey reads Martoma I as
endorsing a definition of unlawful tipping that applies anytime information is
imparted with an expectation that the tippee will trade. He notes, rightly,
that that would indeed set Dirks on its head if read literally—under the facts
in Dirks, it could fairly be said that the whistleblowers should have
“expected” Dirks to tip his clients to sell while helping expose the fraud, yet
the Court held that there was no insider trading liability for anyone involved.
To be sure, if the tipper-tippee test were reformulated to say that there is a
tip anytime information is imparted by an insider with such an expectation,
the test would be overbroad. By reference to text extracted verbatim from
Dirks about “intention to benefit,” however, Martoma I is plainly using the
word expect to mean a motivation to facilitate or enable as a form of selfish
use. In any event, Martoma II discarded this emphasis on expectation in
favor of intent.
95
96
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If we are reasoning from first principles, it is unclear why
personal benefit is a better test than what Macey really seems to
want to get at—business purpose—as suggested in Martoma II.
The standard reading of Dirks from the beginning is that a tip
genuinely motivated by a belief that the tip is in the issuer’s best
interest does not violate Rule 10b-5. A handful of courts in the
Second Circuit have suggested that business purpose or not is
indeed a sound way to apply Dirks: if no plausible business
purpose can be gleaned from the facts, the presumption is of
personal benefit.97 Indeed, this follows from the reading of Dirks
given earlier: objective evidence from which to infer subjective
(selfish) purpose.
However this particular issue is resolved, I worry that it
concedes too much authority to the “owner” of the information.
This is inevitable under the fraud-on-the-source approach to
misappropriation, where it is clear that the owner can license
others to trade on the information for any reasons it wishes,
regardless of any adverse effects on the marketplace. The law is
far less clear under the classical theory, which makes me less
inclined to put it in storage the way Judge Rakoff seems willing.
Suppose an independent, disinterested board of directors
authorizes the CEO and CFO (and others, perhaps) to trade with
abandon on any inside information they possess. (A more
realistic example might be to allow senior executives to trade
without restriction for 48 hours after the latest 10-K or 10-Q.)
Would that provide a complete defense to an insider trading
charge brought by the SEC, assuming that the defendant
possessed material non-public information at the time of the
trade? Property-rights advocates would argue, with some force,
See LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING, supra, sec. 4:7 at 4-20, 4-21, citing, e.g.,
SEC v. Rubin, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) par. 97,784 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also SEC
v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995). The government made this argument to
the Supreme Court in Salman, but the Court affirmed on narrower grounds.
97
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that the issuer owns the information, so that assuming proper
corporate governance principles are satisfied, those in authority
can waive the fiduciary obligations that would otherwise attach,
just as under the misappropriation theory. But if we see the
classical theory as a federally created duty owed to marketplace
traders, it is far from clear that such absolution would work
simply by operation of the principles of corporate governance,
especially given the anti-waiver provisions of the ’34 Act.98
Precedent favors treating trading by the issuer itself (stock
buybacks in particular) as unlawful under Rule 10b-5 if the issuer
is in possession of undisclosed material facts.99 But if the issuer
cannot trade based on inside information, why is Dirks commonly
read to say that selective disclosure (tipping to an analyst or
active shareholder) is permissible so long as intended to carry out
company policy, which is Newman’s high ground?100 I have
already given reasons why Dirks can (and should, I think) be read
to preclude issuer-authorized selective disclosure as an
intentional gift, though I realize the conventional reading of Dirks
Both Chiarella and Dirks triggered some debate about “issuer-authorized”
insider trading For an extensive discussion with citations as the pros and
cons of insider trading as a default rule, see Gubler, supra, at 1263-67. For an
argument in favor, see John P. Anderson, Where’s the Harm in Issuer
Authorized Insider Trading?, 69 U. Miami L. Rev. 795 (2015). At least under
Delaware corporate law, securities law liability is outside the scope of the
internal affairs doctrine, see Sciabacbucchi v. Salzburg (Del. Ch. 2018), and
the duty of loyalty is non-waivable in the face of claims of unfairness.
99 See Langevoort, INSIDER TRADING, supra, sec. 3:6 at 3-9, 3-10 (discussing
cases). See also Mark Loewenstein & William K.S. Wang, The Corporation as
Insider Trader, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 45 (2005). The SEC agrees. See Purchases
of Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 47 Fed. Reg. 5333, 5334 n.5
(Nov. 26, 1982); id., 68 Fed. Reg. 64952, 64953 n.5 (Nov. 17, 2003), On the
policy importance of this, see Jesse Fried, Insider Trading via the Corporation,
162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 801 (2014).
100 I and other academics have posed some version of this question for some
time. See Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider
Trading, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1023 (1990); see also Langevoort, INSIDER TRADING,
supra, sec. 4:7 at 4-22 to -24. More recently, with reference to Newman and
Martoma, see Fox et al., supra; Guttentag, supra.
98
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has been otherwise for long enough to make it seem taken for
granted. There are also functional ones, as offered by Fox et al. or
the concern—much more evident today than when Dirks was
decided—that analysts and traders have conflicts of interest than
can distort efficiency when trying to curry favor with issuers;
conversely, executives of the issuer are tempted to use tips as a
currency, favoring those who recommend the company’s stock (or
might be willing to do so) but freezing out the nay-sayers.101 And
then there is Regulation FD, which is a distinct duty of public
disclosure imposed on issuers when choosing to convey
nonpublic information to market professionals or professional
traders. As Donna Nagy has pointed out, an issuer-authorized tip
is almost always an FD violation, from which it follows that any
authorized agent of the issuer is choosing to violate the law when
engaged in selective disclosure—something readily seen as a
breach of good faith and loyalty. FD has vocal critics102 but is the
law, which severely undermines the point of view that Dirks
wants to protect and encourage informal disclosure. But here,
too, there may well be enough water over the dam that selective
disclosure intended for company benefit will not seriously be
questioned by the courts. The insider trading canon may be
closing.

IV. TIPPEE LIABILITY
DOCTRINE

AND THE

CRIMINALIZATION

OF

INSIDER TRADING

Powell’s view of the entirely healthy activities of analysts ignored the role
of conflicts of interest; the crackdown on analysts who “sold” positive spins
on their recommendations for either access or banking business suggests a
more measured endorsement.
102 For a balanced discussion of costs and benefits, see Jill Fisch, Regulation
FD: An Alternative Approach to Addressing Informational Asymmetry, in
Bainbridge, RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra.
101
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All the debate over gratuitous tips was really just a preface
to the bigger question of what a tippee has to know about the
tipper and the tip in order to face liability. This is Newman’s
surviving contribution: the tippee has to know of the tipper’s
breach of duty, including the personal benefit.103 Martoma
acknowledges that this contribution stands unchallenged, at least
in criminal cases, notwithstanding the trashing of the gift
holding.104
That can be a tough standard for enforcers to meet when
there is a chain of tippees who have not directly observed how the
conveyance of inside information happened. Dirks seems to speak
to this clearly, but in a way that seems to contradict Newman:
liability follows when the tippee “knows or should know” of the
tipper’s breach.105 That language flummoxed the courts shortly
after the Court’s ruling, and still does.106 The main question was
how this interacts with the scienter requirement under Rule 10b5 (the product of an earlier Powell opinion for the Court in the
Hochfelder case107).
“Should know” suggests a negligence
standard, whereas Hochfelder rules that out. Courts in the Second
Circuit and elsewhere never quite sorted this through. Many took
the pragmatic step of substituting a recklessness standard, or
conscious disregard.108
This particular muddle, along with others we have seen, led
to Obus. Somewhat heroically, Obus tore notice and scienter
asunder, holding that the former addresses the duty issue alone—
when is it fair to treat the tippee as participant in a co-venture
that somehow fiduciarizes him? A liberal notice approach suffices
773 F.3d at 449.
Of course a more expansive approach to gift tips makes it somewhat
easier to argue that the defendant knew that the tip was meant as a gift.
105 646 U.S. at 660.
106 See LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING, supra, sec. 4:10 at 4-36 to -40.
107 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
108 See SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp.1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
103
104
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for that, said the court. Separately, enforcers must show scienter,
but that only goes to whether the tippee or traded “while in
knowing possession” of such information. Neither notice nor
awareness was required of the benefit sought by the insidertipper. This was not what Southern District judges, for the most
part, thought the law was, and Judge Rakoff was particularly taken
aback.109 A split within the district ensued, which brought us
Newman.
Going back to Dirks’ original intent, Obus is right about one
thing. Justice Powell did not see his test (which for him was all
about the tipper’s disloyal purpose) as addressing the scienter
requirement.110 His notes show that he was troubled by this state
of mind duality, but in early drafts the tension was minimal: the
tippee had to know of the breach (and presumably the benefit).
But without much explanation, the crucial words “or should
know” were later inserted. (Powell’s clerk at the time, now a
federal judge, recalls vaguely that this was just an effort to
conform to language in pre-Chiarella precedent.111) But the
purported separation of duty and scienter is grossly unsatisfying;
as courts quickly realized, scienter logically extends to all facts
relevant to culpability. Awareness of the breach, in other words,
should be crucial to determining tippee guilt.
Newman makes tippee knowledge of the breach and the
benefit essential, which does quite a beat-down on Obus. With a
wink to Judge Rakoff about Delphic opinions, Newman largely
United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
See Pritchard, supra, at 867-68.
111 Id. at 864-65 & n. 43. This makes some sense in that the more expansive
formulation could be found in two authorities cited at around this point in
the opinion, Professor Louis Loss, and former SEC Commissioner Richard
Smith, whose concurring opinion in an SEC administrative proceeding in
many ways gave Powell a roadmap for (and was repeatedly cited in)
Chiarella and Dirks. See In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 650
(1971). On the context in which both Smith and Loss were working with
respect to insider trading, see Langevoort, Two Duties, supra.
109
110
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ignores both Obus and the “should know” language in Dirks.112
There is a fairly clear way of explaining the result and minimizing
the damage to Obus, which I have always assumed to be the case.
Newman strongly suggests that Judge Parker was addressing the
criminal standard for liability,113 which (in addition to demanding
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the 10b-5 violation) insists on
a showing of willfulness. If the decision had been based on what
willful should mean in prosecutions of remote tippees, the
analysis would have some appeal.
But it doesn’t say that
explicitly (though he mentions willfulness briefly), leading to still
unresolved uncertainty (noted even in Judge Pooler’s dissent in
Martoma I114) about the applicability of the strict Newman test in
civil cases. Rakoff took note of this shortly after Newman,
suggesting that appellate judges pay more attention to willfulness
and be clearer about the civil-criminal divide, and concluding that
allegations of recklessness or conscious avoidance suffice with
respect to the tippee’s awareness of the personal benefit in SEC
cases.115
But perhaps something more subtle is also going on. Judge
Rakoff points out that when insider trading cases are brought
112

it.

Newman quotes the language from Dirks but never comes back to address

For an out-of-circuit decision concluding that this is the proper
interpretation, see United States v. Parigian, 824 F.3d 5, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2016).
Salman takes as a given the government’s acknowledgement that Newman’s
knowledge test applied in that case, which was criminal. See generally
Strader, (Re)conceptualizing Insider Trading: United States v. Newman and
the Intent to Defraud, 80 Brook. L. Rev. 1419 (2015).
114 839 F.3d at 77 n .9
115 SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp.3d 558, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). A finding of
liability in Payton was subsequently affirmed, 726 Fed. Appx. 832 (2d Cir.
2018). At roughly the same time as Judge Rakoff, another judge in the
Southern District moved in the same direction by suggesting that the
standard for tippee liability in civil cases should still be drawn from Obus. See
SEC v. Jafar, 2015 WL 3604228 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Conscious avoidance
generally suffices in criminal as well as civil cases. See, e.g., United States v.
Goffer, 721 F.3d 113, 127-29 (2d Cir. 2013).
113
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criminally, courts may feel “obliged to define unlawful insider
trading narrowly, so as to provide the fair notice that due process
requires before a person may be placed in jeopardy of
imprisonment. Other times those cases are civil proceedings, most
often brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, in
which circumstance a court is inclined to define unlawful insider
trading broadly, so as to effectuate the remedial purposes behind
the prohibition of such trading.”116 To think of insider trading as
embezzlement, or tippee liability as a straightforward stolen
goods problem, is to frame insider trading as naturally and
ordinarily criminal. But that is a late arriving point of view. For
most of the first two decades of federal insider trading
enforcement, insider trading law was entirely generated by SEC
administrative proceedings and enforcement action.117 Given the
entirely equitable nature of the remedies available to the SEC back
then (disgorgement and/or an injunction),118 it was not surprising
that the law could be applied so flexibly. Private rights of action
seeking damages for insider trading (part of the Texas Gulf
Sulphur story) became of serious concern, but soon enough was
calmed via a distinctly restitutionary approach to measuring
damages.119 Criminal insider trading cases did not happen at all
until Chiarella’s time; the Boesky-era spate of high visibility
prosecutions didn’t come until later in the 1980s.120
I do worry that as we think and talk about insider trading
more through the lens of criminality, courts have come to fashion
97 F. Supp.3d at 559.
See Langevoort, Two Duties, supra.
118
Until 1984, the SEC’s remedy in an insider trading matters was
disgorgement of profits and, possibly, an injunction against future
violations—both purely equitable remedies. See LANGEVOORT, INSIDER
TRADING, supra, sec. 8:1 at 8-2 to -3
119 This was first by judicial ruling, Elkind v. Liggett & Myers Inc., 635 F.2d
156 (2d Cir. 1980), and then incorporated into Section 20A(b)(1) of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984.
120 LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING, at 1-3 to -4; see generally JAMES STEWART, DEN
OF THIEVES (1991).
116
117
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the law accordingly. By the criminalization of doctrine, I mean
doctrinal choices made by the courts either to reflect its peculiarly
criminal nature or attend to concerns about lenity, notice and due
process under the threat of incarceration.121 My concern is that
insider trading law may suffer when tweaks in doctrine occur that
have prosecution in mind but then also burden the SEC in civil
cases because they affect the meaning of the rule. This is part of
what Rakoff was saying.
Consider the facts of Newman in a civil enforcement context.
The defendants were third and fourth level tippees of earningsrelated information from Dell and Nvidia, which came from midlevel insiders at the issuers. The “gift” part of the case arose
because it was not obvious why they leaked the information;
there were casual relationships between the insiders and the
analyst/acquaintances who were the first-level tippees, not
known on down the chain of other tippees. However, the leaks
were high quality and repeated, suggesting deliberateness from
within the companies. The court (and notable commentators122)
stressed that these leaks might well have been designed to serve
the issuer’s interests, but if these particular tippers were acting
with authorization, we would seem to have a gross violation of the
SEC’s Regulation FD.123 As quite a number of courts have said, it

See Justice Scalia’s objections to the denial of certiorari in United States v.
Whitman, 135 S.Ct. 352 (2014).
122 See Macey, supra.
123
As noted, Regulation FD is an SEC disclosure rule requiring that if
material non-public information is to be given to analysts or active
shareholders, it must simultaneously be disclosed to the public. See
LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING sec. 12:12. By all accounts, it was adopted by the
SEC because of concern that under Dirks, selective disclosure is hard to
sanction. The category of persons whose disclosure trigger the FD obligation
include lower or mid-level personnel authorized by higher ups to convey
such information; unauthorized personnel are presumed to be acting for
personal benefit. I agree with Donna Nagy, supra, that FD ought to play a role
in fashioning insider trading rules, even though it explicitly is not an insider
121
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can be reckless to ignore the likelihood that multiple accurate tips
were somehow the product of innocence.124 If brought by the SEC,
I believe, such a case should go to a well-instructed jury for a
determination of liability. Nothing in Obus stands in the way,
while the language in Newman encourages resistance.
There are other places where insider trading law has been
narrowed seemingly out of fear of the consequences in criminal
prosecutions. Another has to do with the meaning of “tip,” also
addressed in Martoma. It is not hard to find recent case law
saying that there is only a tip if the tipper “expects” the tippee to
trade; others have suggested different wording: “intending” there
to be trading, or “with the understanding that” there will be
trading,” for example.125 But in the civil context, Obus had clearly
opened the possibility to reckless tips.126 This harkens back to
cases like Libera, before it was clear that Dirks’ personal benefit
standard even applied to misappropriation claims. Recall that it
was not clear that the insiders knew what the recipients intended
to do with the leaked copies of Business Week. The court affirmed
the conviction, refusing to impose more exacting definition of tip.
trading rule itself. An intentional violation of Regulation FD is, under
contemporary corporate law, a breach of loyalty.
124 See note --- supra.
125 See United States v. Stewart, 907 F.3d 677 (2d Cir. 2018)(“intended”);
United States v. Gannsman, 657 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2011)(“expects”). In the
arguments in the Salman case in the Supreme Court, the government
acknowledged an “expectation” test to what constitutes a tip in order to
reduce concerns about its broad approach to personal benefit. Again, the
position is set forth in the Salman opinion, without necessarily any
endorsement or criticism. 137 S.Ct. at 427. This is relevant to the curious
conundrum about whether 10b-5 applies to a “tip” where the tipper’s
purpose is to freeze the recipient from trading for fear of liability once
material nonpublic information has been imparted. See Andrew Verstein,
Informational Tainting: Strategic Tipping of Material Nonpublic Information,
112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 725 (2018).
126 693 F.3d at 287, offering a hypothetical of an insider on a commuter train
talking about work on his cell phone while aware that potential traders are in
earshot. I have wondered about how this squares with the personal benefit
requirement. See Langevoort, Fine Distinctions, supra, at 446-51.
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The circumstances made clear that it was “not for nothing” that
the misappropriation was occurring, and that was enough to hold
the tippees liable. That makes a great deal of common sense, but
might not pass today’s stricter test as the intentionality locution
becomes the common reading.
A third example goes back a bit further, to the debate over
whether liability for insider trading requires proof that the trader
bought or sold because of the inside information, or merely that
he or she possessed it at the time of the trading (possession
versus use). The Second Circuit settled on and has stuck to a
possession test,127 which is more enforcer friendly. By contrast,
the Ninth Circuit insisted on use in a criminal case,128 and the
Eleventh Circuit followed its lead even in an SEC enforcement
action,129 albeit with a rebuttable presumption of use upon a
showing of possession. The SEC tried to resolve this conflict by
rule-making, saying in Rule 10b5-1, which somewhat oddly says
that unlawful must be “on the basis of” the inside information
(suggesting the possibility of a use standard) but then defining
that phrase to be satisfied upon a showing that the person in
question “was aware of” the information at the time of trading.
Even this, however, has not put an end to the disagreement in the
circuits, with many courts outside the Second Circuit holding to a
use standard at least in criminal cases, and perhaps civil as
well.130 Some simply ignore 10b5-1; others express doubt about
the Commission’s power to take this doctrinal issue away from
them.131
My point here is not to criticize these moves, but rather to
urge caution. At heart, insider trading liability is an equitable
See Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v.
Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993).
128 United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).
129 SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).
130 See LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING sec. 3:14, at 3-43 (collecting cases).
131 E.g., United States v. Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140, 1168-70 (8th Cir. 2008).
127
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doctrine, with a duty to disclose imposed on fiduciaries and their
confederates as a market cleansing device, a signal of commitment
to the idea that while the playing field will never be even,
disparities shouldn’t be exploited by those who are supposed to
be acting for the benefit of others in handling sensitive secrets.
This requires some balance and restraint, as Merritt Fox and his
co-authors stress.132 Insider trading threatens liquidity, as a
matter of adverse selection; at the same time, we don’t want to
interfere with legitimate efforts to make prices more efficient.
They think insider trading law as currently formulated does
reasonably well at this balance under both the classical and
misappropriation theories, and civil remedies give the SEC and
the courts great discretion in matching the remedy to the conduct.
My fear is that thinking about insider trading mainly as a
crime pulverizes these nuances. On one hand, it leads to an
inflation of the perceived harm from insider trading and tipping,
causing enforcers and judges to get on a rhetorical high horse to
justify the painful criminal sanctions that we now expect upon
conviction. None of this is to advocate for a robust permission to
engage in insider trading a la Henry Manne and the (relatively
few) of his evangelists who remain133—cumulatively, the threats
to good disclosure practices, corporate confidentiality and market
liquidity mount up to good cause for regulation and enforcement.
I don’t even object to the dramaturgical nature of the campaign,
given the branding effect mentioned earlier. But in making
doctrine, judges and enforcers shouldn’t lose sight of what really
is at stake, and, as Rakoff says, choose their words carefully.

V. NEVER MIND: THE BLASZCZAK DETOUR
See Fox et al., supra.
E.g., Mercer Bullard, Insider Trading in a Mannean Marketplace, 88
Temple L. Rev. 223 (2016).
132
133

44

January 8, 2019 Draft

With this we come to the Second Circuit’s most recent
judicial revisionism of insider trading law, United States v.
Blaszczak.134 In it, we receive the news that the Dirks personal
benefit test only applies to claims securities fraud within the
confines of Rule 10b-5 (or more precisely, the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934), not to mail or wire fraud prosecutions or the “new”
criminal securities fraud statute (18 USC section 1348) enacted as
part of Sarbanes-Oxley’s response to the financial reporting
scandals almost twenty years ago. In other words, forget all the
foregoing discussion of personal benefit when prosecutors choose
to attack insider trading under one of those alternative criminal
statutes.
By now, it should be clear that I do not think that Dirks
personal benefit test accomplishes much, and so I am not by any
means displeased with the result in Blaszczak. On the other hand,
the result invites bringing challenging tipper-tippee cases
(especially chain-link ones) as criminal rather than civil cases,
contrary to how insider trading enforcement is meant to work—
the point made in the previous section.
Judge Sullivan’s opinion is an embrace of embezzlement as
the touchstone for these Title 18 statutes, which does connect it to
all the foregoing in this essay. He is channeling (with attribution
via multiple citations) what both Judges Winter135 and Rakoff136
have said: that when we think of insider trading as
misappropriation akin to embezzlement, a stolen goods approach
--- F.3d --- (2d Cir. 2019).
In his concurring opinion in Chestman, 947 F.2d at 581, Judge Winter
explicitly addressed the relationship between Rule 10b-5 and mail fraud
doctrine as to personal benefit, acknowledging that it was a hard question he
was not ready to answer.
136 Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp.3d at 298; see also Rakoff’s opinion in United
States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp.2d at --.
134
135
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to the liability of those who receive tips makes sense without any
personal benefit gloss. As we have seen, until Obus, that was
arguably the 10b-5 law in the Second Circuit, and so—albeit only
in the criminal context—Blaszczak may just be correcting the
wobble from Obus’ earlier apparent mischaracterization of Libera
and Falcone.137 This makes it at least a partial stealth overruling,
without even touching Rule 10b-5.138
Blaszczak treats wire fraud and the SOX crime as essentially
the same for this purpose, but they really are two distinct statutes.
The law of mail and wire fraud is massive, even as to the specific
issue of misappropriation of intangible property, and certainly as
to the “honest services” jurisprudence that went into its own
wobble and hasn’t ever, so far as I can tell, found stability.139 In its
decision in Carpenter,140 the Supreme Court explicitly accepted
the possibility that mail and wire fraud can reach insider trading
even when Rule 10b-5 doesn’t;141 starting immediately in the
aftermath of its decision (which made many securities law types
uncomfortable142), commentators and judges asked whether
See text accompanying notes --- supra.
Judge Sullivan wrote the district court opinion in the Newman case that
took Obus about awareness of personal benefit at its word, and was then
famously reversed.
139 Illustrated most notably the Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Skilling, 130 S.Ct. 2836 (2010). See Note, Reframing the Right: Using Theories
of Intangible Property to Target Honest Services Fraud after Skilling, 112
Colum. L. Rev. 359 (2012).
140 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 350 (1987).
141 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 678 n. 25. The Court indicated that it was not its
job to decide whether this kind of result was good enforcement policy. In
Blaszczak, puzzlingly also sought to bolster the case for allowing mail fraud
to have a broader reach than Rule 10b-5 by reference to Justice Thomas’s
dissenting opinion in O’Hagan, and United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 953
(4th Cir. 1995), both of which were efforts to strike down the
misappropriation theory under Rule 10b-5—which the majority of the Court
rejected.
142
See John C. Coffee Jr., Hush! The Criminal Status of Confidential
Information after McNally and Carpenter, and the Enduring Problem of
Overcriminalization, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev.121 (1988).
137
138

46

January 8, 2019 Draft

Dirks’ personal benefit test should have any continuing place with
respect to crimes akin to embezzlement.143 Whatever the
preferred answer, the issue was always in plain sight but of little
import so long as personal benefit was easily found, which only
changed after Newman. Judge Rakoff has long been a mail/wire
fraud exceptionalist (he once called mail fraud the prosecutors’
“Stradivarius”144), wanting to treat securities fraud as a mere
“specialized subspecies” of the more fundamental mail and wire
fraud prohibition.145
Section 1348, on the other hand, is meant for the world of
public company securities fraud, though characterized by
immense confusion about why it was needed, what it does
differently from Section 32(a) of the ’34 Act, etc. whether as to
insider trading or more generally.146 There are some obvious
possibilities, but none make it easy to walk the line between
undue vagueness on one hand and duplication of Section 32(a) on
the other.147 Judge Sullivan takes some liberties here when he

See, e.g., Michael Dreeben, Insider Trading and Intangible Rights: The
Redefinition of the Mail Fraud Statute, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 181, 214 (1988).
More recently, Bill Wang gave this issue substantial coverage in his article
Application of Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes to Criminal Liability for Stock
Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70 U. Miami L. Rev. 220 (2015).
144 Rakoff, supra, at 771.
145 United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp.2d 363, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d
555 Fed. Appx. 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
146 A principal proponent in Congress was Senator Patrick Leahy, who
indicated the need to create a mechanism for prosecution not bounded by
technical limitations. That is odd, because that is precisely why Section 10(b)
was created. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 385 (1990). Perhaps Leahy would
point to the decision by Enron prosecutors to charge a margin violation to
avoid a more complicated route to convictions. See William Widen, Enron at
the Margin, 58 Bus. Law. 961 (2003).
147 On the possibilities, see Woody, supra; Couture, supra (suggesting a
lower threshold of materiality); Langevoort, INSIDER TRADING, sec. 8:13. The
most noteworthy decision of relevance to insider trading until Blaszczak was
United States v. Mahaffy, 693 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2012), which tracked the
143
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says that “as Dirks explained, in order to protect the free flow of
information into the securities markets, Congress enacted the
Title 15 fraud provision with the limited ‘purpose of . . .
[e]liminating [the] use of inside information for personal
advantage.’” Actually, that sentence in Dirks (ignoring all the
brackets and ellipses) says that removing personal advantage was
just a purpose, among many.148
My unease with Blaszczak simply takes us back to what we
said earlier about the embezzlement/stolen goods label.
Information use and dissemination from inside public companies
is immensely weighty as a matter of policy, much more than the
simplistic invocation of embezzlement can bear. “Akin to” is not
the same as “is.” Reference to breach of fiduciary duty is required
in ordinary classical and misappropriation enforcement
proceedings in order to address the “fine distinctions” between
good and bad ways of obtaining or using material nonpublic
information. Existing doctrine could surely do better, but it would
require something more than reference to stolen goods. Imagine
if Raymond Dirks was prosecuted for mail fraud. My sense is that
Equity Funding’s property right in the exclusive use of its inside
information (or Dirks’ awareness of Secrest’s interference) would
not play much of a role in its outcome. It’s in Title 15 that we see
so much more to the conundrum, which shouldn’t be shoved aside
simply by invoking Title 18.
Newman provides another good example. We have already
seen that its outcome could have been different if brought as a
civil enforcement action by the SEC. There was surely ambiguity
about how and why the information leaked from the two
companies and made its way into the hands of the portfolio
managers three or four times removed. Dirks’ “should know”
misappropriation theory in a front-running case involving broker-dealer
dissemination of “squawk box” information to favored clients.
148 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
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phrase helps to make sense of competing narratives as to the
insiders’ motives. Note that back in the days when tipper-tippee
law drew a distinction between classical and misappropriation
cases, cases like Libera and Falcone still applied everything about
the Dirks test except personal benefit. If we do indeed move to a
world where Title 18 crimes are charged more frequently to avoid
Dirks, there will be much more work for the courts to do in
fashioning good policy and doctrine, and getting the enforcement
incentives right. Again, I’m happy to see personal benefit go,
whatever the enforcement vehicle. But Title 15 “theory” deserves
its say in puzzling through what should take its place in hard
cases.

VI. CONCLUSION
“But the uneasiness of sending a good person to jail for a long time
based on a very abstract definition of harm was tough to swallow,
because Rakoff understood the intellectual disconnects very well.
There was a special irony in invoking [the misappropriation]
doctrine designed to promote [a more] even playing field for public
investors in a case where the role of poor victim was played by
Goldman Sachs.”149

All the previous quotes have been Rakoff’s. This last one is
mine, which I wrote a few years ago about the difficulties Judge
Rakoff faced and to an extent expressed in sentencing Rajat Gupta
to two years in prison in one of the biggest insider trading cases of
the time. Rakoff was trying to make sense of how and why a
seemingly good man like Gupta acted as he did, and the right
penalty for a crime that might well have caused no direct
pecuniary harm at all to its victim, notwithstanding what the
DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL
STREET AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 63 (2016).
149
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Sentencing Guidelines were saying about a longer period of
incarceration. My impression was that Rakoff understood very
well the uneasy nature of insider trading law and enforcement,
more than he could say out loud in sentencing Gupta
The best animating rhetoric for insider trading regulation
today can be found in Rakoff’s own words: the promise to fight
against a playing field that is tilted in favor of cheaters, i.e., those
who would wrongfully exploit their access to secrets.150 His
insider trading jurisprudence (holdings, dicta and asides) harkens
back to Chief Justice Burger in Chiarella, who had the good idea of
building a more expansive source of wrongful access or use while
avoiding the unrealism of equal access.151 Going back a number of
years now, Rakoff has been calling for Congress to replant the
garden maze of doctrine that has too many circles and dead ends
by writing a clear statutory definition of insider trading.152 Putting
aside his claim that insider trading is a straightforward concept
(with which I disagree), he is surely right about the unnecessary
complications some courts have caused. Surely there is a better
way going forward.
SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp.3d 558, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)(Rakoff, J.: “The
Unites States securities markets—the comparative honesty of which is one of
our nation's great business assets—cannot tolerate such cheating if those
markets are to retain the confidence of investors and the public alike”).
151
See Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High about Rule 10b-5:
Chiarella’s History, Central Bank’s Future, 20 Del. J. Corp. L. 866, 883-84
(1995). Donna Nagy has long championed Burger’s view of misappropriation
as well. See sources cited in notes – supra. I read Burger as grounding the
case against Chiarella in terms of embezzlement or theft, but not confining
the 10b-5 duty to violations of positive criminal law. His approach
presumably takes in all wrongful ways of obtaining or using inside
information.
152 United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v.
Payton, 97 F. Supp.3d 558, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Many others agree. E.g.,
Roberta D. Karmel, The Fiduciary Principle of Insider Trading Needs Revision,
56 Wash. U.J.L. & Pol’y 121 (2018). Rakoff is currently taking part in the
revisionist
effort.
See
Insider
Trading
Isn’t
So
Simple,
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-15/insider-tradingisn-t-so-simple.
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